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Comment
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: The
Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in Digital
Sampling Copyright Infringement Claims – The
Sixth Circuit’s Flawed Attempt at a Bright-Line
Rule
Matthew R. Brodin∗
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if
any, things which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used
before . . . . If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was not
new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be
no ground for any copy-right in modern times, and we would be obliged
to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such
eminence. Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew from earlier
as well as contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning
of his profession; and even Shakespeare and Milton . . . would be found
to have gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge
and classical studies in their days.
-Justice Story1
INTRODUCTION
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,2 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals announced a new bright-line rule for
sound recording copyright infringement that will have
∗ J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000,
University of Colorado - Boulder.
1. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)
(Story, J.).
2. 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
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significant effects on the hip-hop music industry.3 In this case
the rap group NWA sampled a single chord from George
Clinton’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” altered the pitch and
tempo, and used it in their song “100 Miles and Runnin’.”4 The
owners of the sound recording copyright to Clinton’s song sued
Dimension Films for infringement after the song was included
in the soundtrack to the Dimension movie “I Got the Hookup.”5
The district court held that the amount copied from “Get Off”
was so small that it was not legally cognizable, or in other
words, the use was de minimis.6 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, announcing a new rule that made the
sampling of a copyright protected sound recording a per se
infringement regardless of the amount copied.7 The hip-hop
industry is worried that this decision will negatively impact
creativity by significantly limiting the amount of music that
artists can legally sample.8
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court opinion and announced the new bright-line rule based
upon its interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976.9 Although
the academic and business publications on the subject offer
support for both the court of appeals opinion and the district
court opinion, the Sixth Circuit‘s interpretation is not
supported by any judicial precedent and is contrary to the
existing persuasive decisions from other districts.
This comment examines the language and the purpose of
the Copyright Act, the applicable case law, and the legal and
professional articles on copyright law as applied to digital
sampling to determine the proper test for establishing the
infringement of a sound recording copyright. Part I outlines
the history of hip-hop music and digital sampling, summarizes
the relevant sections of the Copyright Act, and reviews the
3. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d
390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F.
Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
7. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 393.
8. See, e.g., Eric Olsen, 3 Notes and Runnin’: Sample Ruling Protest
(Sept.
15,
2004)
(calling
the
ruling
a
“disaster”),
at
http://blogcritics.org/archives/2004/09/15/200145.php (last visited Apr. 8,
2005); Chris Reynolds, Sampling the Future, TECHNICIAN (Sept. 16, 2004), at
http://www.technicianonline.com/story.php?id=010041 (last visited Mar. 24,
2005).
9. See Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 396-401.
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applicable case law. Part II analyzes the decisions of both the
district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films10 with respect to
that background. Part III concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s
decision is inconsistent with the language and purpose of the
Copyright Act, and that the correct decision is the one outlined
in the opinion by the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. DIGITAL SAMPLING AND THE BIRTH OF HIP-HOP MUSIC
Digital music sampling is the practice of digitally recording
existing sound recordings and adding them to other sampled or
original sound recordings to create new music.11 The process
involves three main steps: digital recording, computer analysis
and alteration, and playback.12 Modern digital sampling
equipment allows the user to isolate vocal and instrumental
sounds and alter their pitch, tempo, and timbre.13 This
provides the sampler with the ability to record and playback an
entire sound recording exactly as it sounded in the original, or
to take smaller samples of the recording and manipulate them
The
into completely new and unrecognizable sounds.14
technological advancements provided by digital sampling
create a wide range of copyright questions that have not been
consistently analyzed or answered by either the courts or
Congress.
The origins of hip-hop music and the modern practice of
digital sampling have been traced to the innovative disc jockeys
(DJs) or “selectors” in Jamaica in the late 1950’s and early
1960’s.15 During this period DJs traveled around the island
performing in small makeshift discos.16 To attract larger
10. 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
11. David S. Blessing, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De
Minimis Use for Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2399, 2403 (2004).
12. Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the
American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879,
880 (1992).
13. Blessing, supra note 11, at 2403.
14. See Houle, supra note 12, at 880-82.
15. Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling – A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 122 (2003).
16. Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright
Law, 11 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 12, 24 (2002).
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audiences, local DJs began modifying the music they played
using turntables and a stereo mixer while talking-over the
music in a chant-like manner.17
In 1974, Jamaican DJ Clive Campbell, a.k.a. “Kool Herc,”
moved to the South Bronx of New York and introduced his
country’s innovative style of music to the United States.18 Kool
Herc became a neighborhood sensation and word of his unique
style and popularity spread quickly.19 Local DJs began to
emulate the methods used by Kool Herc, sampling and rapping
over the break beats from popular Latin, R&B and disco
music.20
As the popularity of this new form of music became
widespread, competition became fierce and DJs began to look
for new ways to extract and mix beats.21 In the early 1980s,
the musical instrumental digital interface (MIDI) synthesizer
came to the market, allowing hip-hop producers to easily
sample recordings in the studio and recreate the music that
DJs were performing live in the clubs.22 As the price of this
technology fell, hip-hop artists were given affordable access to
the unique and almost endless possibilities provided by digital
sampling.23
In 1979, the commercial release and mainstream success of
Sugar Hill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” which contained music
appropriated from Chic’s popular disco hit “Good Times,”
created questions of the applicability of copyright law to this
new form of music.24 Unfortunately, the Copyright Act of 1976
(the “Act”) provided little if any clarity for musicians and those
in the music recording industry.
B. COPYRIGHT LAW
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
17. Id.; Latham, supra note 15, at 122; see also Stephen R. Wilson, Music
Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis
Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 182 (2002).
18. Latham, supra note 15, at 122.
19. Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 25.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 25-26.
22. Latham, supra note 15, at 123.
23. See Blessing, supra note 11, at 2403-04.
24. Jason H. Marcus, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of
Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767, 770
(1991).
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”25 Congress first
utilized this authority in 1790 by adopting a federal Copyright
Act, amending it several times since.26 The most recent version
is the Copyright Act of 1976.27
The Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”28 “Originality in the copyright
sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author,
i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other
works.”29 In addition, to command copyright protection a work
must contain a minimal amount of creativity.30
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the
work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work
publicly, perform the work publicly, display the work publicly,
and perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.31 Under section 102(a) of the Act, both “musical
works, including any accompanying words” and “sound
This
recordings” are included as works of authorship.32
complicates matters for musicians attempting to obtain a
license to sample a song, as they must negotiate a license for
both the sound recording copyright and the underlying
composition copyright, which are often owned by two separate
parties.
1. Purpose of Copyright Law
As the Constitution states, the purpose of music copyright
protection is to promote the progress of a useful art.33 In other
words, copyright protection is intended to promote artistic
creativity and innovation that will be a benefit to the public.34
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Blessing, supra note 11, at 2405.
27. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000)).
28. Id. § 101.
29. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.01 (2004).
30. Id. (“Illustrative of the requirement of minimal creativity are those
cases that deny copyright protection to fragmentary words or phrases,
noncreative variations of musical compositions, numbers generated
sequentially or randomly, and to forms of expression dictated solely by
functional considerations.”).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
32. Id. § 102(a).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
34. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
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To achieve these ends, the Copyright Act grants copyright
holders a limited monopoly over their work.35 This provides an
incentive for creation by providing a financial benefit, for
example, the exclusive right to the revenue from licensing fees,
sales, royalties, and performance fees.36
However, “the financial reward guaranteed to the
copyright holder is but an incident of this general objective,
rather than an end in itself.”37 As the Supreme Court stated,
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object
in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors.”38 Thus, the benefits
of copyright protection are intended to promote maximization
of public benefit. Any private benefit experienced by creators is
incidental to this purpose.
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant copyright protection is the belief that the
economic benefit provided by the limited monopoly is the best
way to advance public welfare.39 However, “courts in passing
upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally
subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum
financial return to the greater public interest in the
development of art, science, and industry.”40
Congress recognized that the economic interests of
copyright holders must give way to the “public interest” in
development of the arts and sciences when limiting the
monopoly power granted in the Act.41 For example: copyrights
are subject to a limited duration of exclusivity;42 sound
recording copyrights are limited to the actual sound recording,
and do not apply against those that imitate or simulate the
copyrighted work;43 and the doctrine of fair use protects the
public interest by granting exemptions for certain educational

(“The immediate effects of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).
35. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 18.
36. See id.
37. Berlin v. E.C. Publ’n, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964).
38. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
39. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
40. See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544.
41. See id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
43. Id. § 114(b).
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uses, news reporting, and criticism.44 The Supreme Court
acknowledged this when stating that the fair use doctrine
requires “courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which the law is designed to foster.”45 Thus, in determining
what constitutes copyright infringement, courts must balance
the incentives to create provided by the monopoly powers of
copyright with the public’s interest in promoting the
development of art, science and industry.
2. What is Copyright Infringement?
The Supreme Court has held that the fundamental
elements of a prima facie case of copyright infringement are:
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original.”46 This
comment will not address all of the intricacies of establishing
the ownership and validity of a copyright, but will instead focus
on the question plaguing the digital sampling music industries
today: what amount of copying is necessary to establish
copyright infringement?
Two distinct components exist within the copying element.
First, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually used
the copyrighted work as a “model, template, or even
inspiration” when creating the disputed work.47 However, even
if copying is proven, the plaintiff must also show that it rose to
a legally cognizable level.48 Recently, some courts and legal
scholars have reformulated the prima facie case of
infringement to add “unlawful appropriation” as a required
element in an effort to emphasize the need to show both actual
and actionable copying.49
If actual copying cannot be proven with direct evidence, a
44. Id. § 107.
45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
46. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
47. Id. at § 13.01[B]. See also Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01[B]).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 125659 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74
(2d Cir. 1997); NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01 n. 26.3; Wilson, supra note 17,
at 185.
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plaintiff may prove copying by introducing circumstantial
evidence demonstrating that the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and that the disputed work is “substantially
similar” to the copyrighted work.50 However, some legal
commentators and recent cases have found the term
“substantially similar” is “more properly used . . . after the fact
of copying has been established, as the threshold for
determining that the degree of similarity suffices to
demonstrate actionable infringement.”51 In an attempt to
clarify this double use of the term “substantially similar,” the
Second Circuit and the Nimmer treatise on copyrights, among
others, have adopted Professor Alan Latman’s suggestion that
the term “probative similarity” should be used for the
determination of copying, and the term “substantial similarity”
should be used for the determination of whether the copying
rises to a legally cognizable level.52 For purposes of clarity,
these definitions will be used throughout the rest of the
commentary.
As noted previously, the factual determination of copying
relies upon a showing of access and probative similarity.
Probative similarities are “similarities that, in the normal
course of events, would not be expected to arise independently
in the two works” and “are probative of defendant’s having
copied as a factual matter from plaintiff’s work.”53 Probative
similarity is a question of fact.54 Once the fact finder has
determined that the defendant has actually copied from the
copyright protected material, they must then determine
whether the copying rose to a legally cognizable level.
To demonstrate that copying has risen to a legally
cognizable level, a plaintiff must prove that the copyrighted
and disputed works are substantially similar.55 The question of
what constitutes substantial similarity is one of the most
difficult questions in copyright law due to the seemingly
ambiguous and subjective tests for infringement used by the

50. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01[B].
51. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74; see also NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 13.02.03.
52. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75; NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 13.03[A];
Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204 (1990).
53. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[B].
54. See id.
55. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A].
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courts.56 On one extreme there is virtually no similarity, on the
other exact similarity, and substantial similarity lies
somewhere in between. Judge Learned Hand addressed this
issue when he stated “[t]he test for infringement of a copyright
is of necessity vague,” and the line will seem arbitrary
wherever it is drawn.57
A few law review authors have commented that the
language of section 114(b) of the Copyright Act58 granting the
copyright holder the exclusive right to create derivative works
from the “actual sounds” of the recording precludes the use of
the substantial similarity test altogether.59 However, many
other scholars, and most recent court decisions, have not
adopted this strict reading of the Act and have included
substantial similarity as a necessary element of a sound
recording infringement action.60
A derivative work is defined by the Copyright Act as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . .
musical arrangement, . . . sound recording, . . . abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”.61

However, a work is considered derivative only if it “has
substantially copied from a prior work.”62 A work that contains
only negligible amounts of previously registered or published
material will be considered a new work, not a derivative
work.63 “To be an infringement the derivative work must be
based upon the copyrighted work.”64 Consequently, if an artist
samples an insubstantial amount of a prior work and
56. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A].
57. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000).
59. See, e.g., Latham, supra note 15 at 125; Marcus, supra note 24, at 776.
60. See, e.g., Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J.
1993); Newton v. Diamond, (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 WL 158364 at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997); J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for
Rethinking Music Copyright Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
407, 416 (2004); Wilson, supra note 17, at 183.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
62. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01.
63. JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE, §
2:22 (rev. ed. Oct. 2004).
64. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5675 (emphasis added).
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incorporates it into a new work, they have not violated section
114(b) of the Copyright Act because they have not infringed
upon the right of the copyright owner to create derivative
works.65 As Nimmer summarizes, “[t]he practice of digitally
sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not be
subject to any special analysis: to the extent that the resulting
product is substantially similar to the sampled original,
liability should result.”66
3. Defenses to Copyright Infringement Claims
The principles of substantial similarity and de minimis use
have been used interchangeably by many courts and scholars.67
To the contrary, these are two distinct principles, each with
different legal implications on copyright issues. By definition,
the de minimis test satisfies the quantitative analysis of
substantial similarity, but not the qualitative. In practice,
however, the term “de minimis” has been used to describe the
defendant’s defense that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
substantial similarity.
a. De Minimis Use
The principle of de minimis use is directly related to, but
not a substitute for, the substantial similarity doctrine. The
legal maxim de minimis non curat lex or “the law does not
concern itself with trifles” has been applied throughout many
areas of the law, including copyright.68 To establish that
copying is de minimis, the defendant must show that it was so
trivial “as to fall below the quantitative threshold of
substantial similarity, which is always a required element of
actionable copying.”69 In other words, if the amount taken from
the copyrighted work is so small that it could not be considered
a legally cognizable infringement, the copying is considered de
minimis and the substantial similarity requirement has not
65. See HAZARD, supra note 63, § 2:22.
66. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2].
67. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 593-95 (9th
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Newton v. Diamond, (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289-91 (D.N.J.
1993).
68. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 185.
69. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Gordon v. Nextel Comm. and Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922,
924 (6th Cir. 2003).
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been met.
The application of this rule, however, has been far from
uniform. Courts have been inconsistent in the determination of
whether or not copying a few notes is de minimis.70
Additionally, there is some confusion as to whether the
sampled portion should be viewed in relation to the original
work, the new work, or both.71
Ultimately, courts have consistently stated that
quantitative analysis alone will rarely determine whether a
particular copying is substantially similar because small
sections can be sufficiently original or important to be
considered a substantial portion of the original work.72
Instead, a copied section of a work must be looked at for both
its quantitative and qualitative importance.73
b. Qualitative Threshold of Substantial Similarity
The de minimis test may be used to determine the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, but the
doctrine also calls for examination of a qualitative threshold.74
Even if the amount copied is quantitatively small, the fact
finder may find substantial similarity if it is qualitatively
important.75 Due to the fact that very few digital sampling
cases make it to court, there are very few applications of the
substantial similarity test in this context.
One test that seems to have emerged in a few circuits is
the ordinary observer/listener/audience test.76 The threshold
70. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 593-95 (9th
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987); Newton v.
Diamond,(“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
71. See Newton II, 349 F.3d 591 (holding that the analysis should only
focus on the original work and not on the defendants when determining
whether the copying was de minimis); Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70 (applying the de
minimis use test by analyzing both the original and the new work).
72. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425 (holding that six notes is a small amount,
but that qualitative analysis is also necessary to determine the sampled
portions importance in the song or originality); Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at
1258 (holding that copying three notes that are not independently original was
de minimis).
73. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425; Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
74. See Latham, supra note 15, at 132-33; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03.
75. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[B][2].
76. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir.
2004) (recognizing the “ordinary observer” test); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music
Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990); Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425; Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
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for substantial similarity in this test has been characterized by
the courts in several different ways, including whether the
defendant copied: “the whole meritorious part of the song;”77
“that portion of the plaintiff’s work upon which its popular
appeal, and hence, its commercial success, depends;”78 “what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners;”79 “so much . . . that the
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially to an injurious extent
appropriated by another;”80 or, “constituent elements of the
work that are original . . . [and] the value of the original work
is substantially diminished by the copying.”81 Another recent
decision adopted the view that substantial similarity would not
exist unless the defendant had copied enough of the
copyrighted work where “the ordinary observer, unless he set
out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as
the same.”82 Any similarities detected by the ordinary observer
should be “without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by
others . . . [and] should be spontaneous and immediate.”83 As
demonstrated, each test is far from clear or even consistent
with any other test.
Although some courts and commentators have stated that
the question of substantial similarity should only focus on the
relationship to the plaintiff’s work,84 the reasonable listener
test almost certainly allows the fact finder to be influenced by
the frequency and the ability to observe the copied material
within the new work.
The reasonable listener test has been highly criticized
because it attempts to force the oft used reasonable person
standard into an area of law that does not contain widely
77. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393,
397 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
78. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
79. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
80. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (giving
the guiding principle written by Justice Story).
81. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (internal
citations omitted).
82. See Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir.
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1256-59
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
83. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[E][1][a] (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp.
v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933)).
84. See Newton II, 349 F.3d at 597; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2].
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recognized social norms.85
Additionally, whereas the
reasonable person is assumed to have the same values and
traits as the ordinary fact finder, it can not be assumed that
the fact finder has the same musical taste or knowledge as a
reasonable listener or audience member.86 Although the test
proves to be extremely inconsistent in its application, it is still
used in many of the recent digital sampling decisions.87
c. Section Copied Not Protected by Copyright
A copyright only protects the portions of a work that are
considered copyrightable.88 According to the Supreme Court,
“[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those
constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de
minimis quantum of creativity.”89 Following this reasoning,
only original elements of a sound recording or musical
composition are protected by a copyright.90 Therefore, it is
unlikely that a single note or beat, unless accompanied by an
additional creative element, would be protected by copyright.91
There are many similarities in the analysis of the
copyrightability of a particular segment of a work and whether
substantial similarity exists between the two works. Very
small portions of a musical work are most likely not protected
by the copyright unless they are sufficiently original.92 If the
portion copied is not original, it would follow that the two
works are not substantially similar due to a lack of any
unlawful appropriation of a qualitatively important part of the
copyrighted work. However, there is evidence that even if a
copied portion is copyrightable, it may still be deemed to be de
minimis.93 Therefore, each of these defenses should be argued
and analyzed separately.
85. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03 [E][2]; Keyes, supra note 60, at
431-32.
86. Keyes, supra note 60, at 431-32.
87. See Newton II, 349 F.3d at 592-93; Newton v. Diamond,(“Newton I”),
204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J. 1993).
88. See Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-54; Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 291.
89. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364
(1991).
90. See, e.g., id; Newton I, 204 F. Supp. at 1252-54; Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at
291, NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2].
91. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2].
92. See id.
93. See Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-54.
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d. Fair Use
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a fair use
exception to copyright infringement “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship,
or research.”94 The fair use doctrine allows “courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity that the law was designed to
foster.”95 The factors to be used when determining whether a
work constitutes fair use include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.96

These factors operate as a balancing test, none alone being
positive or dispositive of fair use.97
The first factor requires the determination of whether the
new work is commercial or non-commercial in nature. Creating
a new work for a commercial purpose is not fatal to a fair use
defense, but it does weigh against it.98 In Campbell v. AcuffRose Music99 the Supreme Court stated that the more
transformative a work is (transformative meaning whether the
work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message”), the more likely it will be deemed fair use.100 The
Court further stated the more transformative the work, the less
significance should be given to the other factors.101
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
analyzes the overall originality and creativity of the work. The
greater the creativity involved in creation of the copyrighted
work, the greater the copyright protection, making it less likely
that the defense of fair use will be accepted.102
94. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
95. Marcus, supra note 24, at 783 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found. v. Am. Broad. Corp., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994);
NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A].
98. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][1].
99. 510 U.S.569 (1994).
100. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
101. Id.
102. See NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 13.05[A][2].
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The third factor is often confused with the determination of
substantial similarity.103 While substantial similarity is a
required element of a copyright infringement action, its
presence does not negate a fair use defense.104 In fact, certain
fair uses, such as a parody, by nature will incorporate a
significant portion of the original work.105 Although the
amount of acceptable similarity in fair use differs with the
substantial similarity determination, the method of analyzing
both the qualitative and quantitative factors of the original
work is the same.106 Ultimately, the amount of copying
permissible will vary with the purpose and character of the
new work.107
The fourth and final factor—the effect on the market or
value of the copyrighted work—requires that the court consider
both the effect of the current actions as well as “whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by
the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market for the original”108 or derivative
works.109 However, only the adverse effects of infringing
actions should be considered, while the adverse effects of noninfringing actions, such as copying of non-copyrightable
material or fair use criticism, should be ignored.110
Interestingly, the original market for a song often benefits
once the song has been sampled and used in a new work.111
However, lack of damages does not negate a finding of
copyright infringement.112 Ultimately, this factor is used to
gather evidence of what actual damages, if any, the copyright
holder has suffered.113
In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated that a parody can
103. Id. § 13.05[A][3].
104. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
105. See, e.g., id.
106. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][3].
107. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
108. Id. at 590 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4]).
109. Id. at 594.
110. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4].
111. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 38-39 (giving examples of artists that
have benefited from having their songs sampled in a rap song).
112. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4] n.221.
113. See id. (“This factor, rather, poses the issue of whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant (whether in
fact engaged in by the defendant or others) would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market for, or value of, the plaintiff’s present
work.”).
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be considered fair use even if it is created for commercial
purposes.114 However, there are many more transformative
uses that could be considered fair use that have not been
considered by the courts. For example, rapper Jay-Z’s use of
the Broadway musical “Annie” song “Hard Knock Life” in his
song of the same name was transformative in that it took the
original message of the difficulty of life in an orphanage and
altered it to help demonstrate the urban struggle of living in
the ghetto.115 The original chorus and melody from the
musical’s theme was sampled and mixed with percussive beats
and rap lyrics resulting in an extremely successful run at the
top of the single charts both nationally and internationally.116
Although Jay-Z paid for a license to sample from “Annie,” his
use of the song to transform an old message regarding a group
of underprivileged and exploited orphans to describe the
current state of children in the ghetto could have been deemed
fair use.117 Ultimately, the lack of precedent and resulting
uncertainty in this area have caused most musicians wishing to
sample for transformative purposes to obtain a license or settle
outside of court.118
C. COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS AND DIGITAL SAMPLING
Copyright violation lawsuits involving digital sampling
have been relatively sparse. In the past, many hip-hop artists
employed a “catch me if you can” mentality, releasing records
full of unlicensed appropriations.119 After the courts began
holding against digital samplers, however, the artists began to
question what types of digital sampling constituted copyright
Unfortunately, the application of the
infringement.120
Copyright Act in cases of digital music sampling has left a
confusing and convoluted history that leaves almost no
certainty as to what constitutes infringement, which party has
the burden of proof, and what tests are to be applied.

114. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88.
115. Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 33-35.
116. Johnny Black, The Greatest Song Ever! Hard Knock Life, BLENDER,
Nov. 2002, at http://www.blender.com/guide/articles.aspx?id=827 (last visited
Apr. 21, 2005).
117. See id.
118. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 179.
119. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123.
120. See id. at 124 n.28 (noting that the boundaries for lawful digital
sampling have not been clearly delineated).
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1. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.
Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.121
was the first major case holding that digital sampling is a
copyright violation.122 At issue was the unlicensed use of
instrumental and lyrical portions of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone
Again (Naturally)” in hip-hop artist Biz Markie’s “I Need a
Haircut.”123 Biz Markie and his record company had attempted
to obtain a license from O’Sullivan, who rejected them
outright.124 The record company went ahead and released the
record without the license and this lawsuit resulted.125
District Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy started his opinion
with the Biblical commandment “Thou shalt not steal,” and
ultimately held that the use of three words and a portion of the
music from the original song was a per se copyright violation.126
The court granted the preliminary injunction requested by the
plaintiffs and further suggested that the case be referred for
Although Judge Duffy did not
criminal prosecution.127
explicitly cite to the Copyright Act and state that all digital
sampling is a per se copyright violation, his opinion was
consistent with this proposition.128
Grand Upright was a major blow to the hip-hop
community.129 Judge Duffy, by ignoring possible defenses of
lack of substantial similarity or fair use, had created a per se
copyright violation for digital sampling.
The number of
unlicensed samples used in commercial releases fell
significantly after the decision.130 However, this also led to
fewer samples being used in hip-hop music.131 Many artists
refused to license songs because of their distaste for hip-hop.132
121. 780 F. Supp 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
122. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123.
123. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
124. Id. at 184.
125. Id. at 185.
126. Id. at 183.
127. Id. at 185.
128. See id. at 183 (“[T]he defendants in this action for copyright
infringement would have this court believe that stealing is rampant in the
music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be excused.
The conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh
Commandment, but also the copyright laws of this country.”).
129. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123-24.
130. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 30.
131. See id. at 31.
132. See id. at 30-31.
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Additionally, many artists who wished to sample were not
financially capable of paying for licenses in advance.133
Ultimately, the decision completely protected copyright owners
while limiting the resources available for hip-hop artists to use
in creation of new music.
2. Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television
In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,134 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals set forth an oft cited test for
substantial similarity. In this case, Ringgold claimed copyright
infringement for the unlicensed use of her artwork entitled
“Church Picnic Story Quilt” in the background of an episode of
the sitcom “ROC.”135 Although this case did not involve music
copyright infringement, the test applied by the court can be
easily adapted to the intricacies of digital sampling. In
addition, the fact that the actual artwork was used for a short
period of time along with many other props and decorations is
similar to a digital sample appearing for a limited amount of
time in a new work among many other sounds.
The court in Ringgold held that the substantial similarity
test required analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative
components of the copying.136 The de minimis test was used to
determine the quantitative component, looking solely at the
amount of the copyrighted work that was copied, “a
consideration that is especially pertinent to exact copying.”137
For the qualitative component the court examined the
“observability of the copied work—the length of time the copied
work is observable in the allegedly infringing work and such
factors as focus, lighting, camera angles, and prominence.”138
Ultimately, the court ruled in this case that the artwork was
clearly visible for a significant amount of time and therefore
substantial similarity existed.139

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id.
126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76-77.
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3. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Management v. Profile Records
In Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Management v. Profile Records,140 the
plaintiff claimed that the defendants illegally copied “certain
drum tracks” from their song “Impeach the President” and used
them in the songs “Back from Hell” and “Dana Dane with
Fame.”141 The Southern District of New York first stated that
to establish unlawful copying a plaintiff “must show (1) actual
copying, and (2) unlawful appropriation.”142 The court further
stated that the test for unlawful appropriation is whether the
works are substantially similar, which ultimately turns on
“whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work.”143 Additionally, “in assessing substantial similarity,
courts look at the works as a whole, as opposed to dissecting a
work into its constituent elements or features.”144 Essentially,
the court found that the test for substantial similarity is if a
person would be able to identify the misappropriation by
listening to both recordings.145
The court ultimately granted summary judgment for the
defendant on several alternate theories. First, the plaintiff
could not prove ownership of the copyright for the original
works.146 Second, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the
elements of access and probative similarity that establish
And finally, the plaintiff failed to
actual copying.147
demonstrate substantial similarity between the songs in
question.148 Thus, summary judgment was appropriate in this
case because the plaintiff could not “make out the essential
elements of the claim.”149

140. 1997 WL 158364 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997).
141. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt. v. Profile Records, 1997 WL 158364, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997).
142. Id. at *3.
143. Id. at *5 (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022
(2d Cir. 1966)).
144. Id. at *5.
145. See id. at *4.
146. Id. at *2-3.
147. Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., 1997 WL 158364 at *3-4.
148. Id. at *4-5.
149. Id. at *2.
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4. Jarvis v. A & M Records
In Jarvis v. A & M Records,150 the District Court of New
Jersey addressed the issue of substantial similarity in the
context of digital sampling. In its analysis, the court adopted
the fragmented literal similarity test for substantial similarity
from Nimmer’s treatise.151 This test is based upon the premise
that the value of the copyrighted work can be “substantially
diminished even when only a part of it is copied, if the part that
is copied is of great qualitative importance to the work as a
whole.”152 The court stated that “[t]he proper question to ask is
whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or
qualitatively, constituent elements of the work that are
original.”153 Therefore, if only a small portion of a copyrighted
work is taken, it can still be substantially similar if the portion
is unique enough to be recognized as an important part of the
original song. However, “[e]asily arrived at phrases and chord
progressions are usually non copyrightable.”154
Applying this test to the case at hand, the court held that
the “ooh,” “move,” and “free your body” vocals and the unique
keyboard line that were sampled, though each alone was not
sufficiently distinctive, were sufficiently original and unique in
their particular arrangement to be considered substantially
similar to the copyrighted work.155 Therefore, the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment was denied.156
5. Newton v. Diamond
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, the music group the Beastie
Boys was sued for the unlicensed sampling of accomplished jazz
flutist James W. Newton’s performance of “Choir” in their song
“Pass the Mic.”157 The Beastie Boys had obtained a license for
the sound recording from ECM Records, but never approached
Newton for a license for the underlying musical composition.158
150. 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993).
151. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 290-91 (D.N.J. 1993).
152. Id. at 291 (quoting Werlin v. Readers Digest Ass’n, 528 F. Supp. 451,
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
153. Id. (internal citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 292.
156. Id.
157. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003),
aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
158. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 593.
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The Beastie Boys copied a three note sequence of “C”—“Dflat”—“C” that lasts for approximately six seconds at the
beginning of “Choir.”159 The sound was made distinctive by
Newton’s vocalization technique, singing while simultaneously
playing each flute note.160 The sample was looped and is heard
in the background of much of “Pass the Mic.”161
The Beastie Boys moved for summary judgment on
Newton’s claim of copyright infringement based on two
arguments: that the portion of “Choir” that they sampled
cannot be protected by copyright as a matter of law; or in the
alternative, any misappropriation was de minimis, and
therefore not actionable.162
a. The District Court Decision – Newton I
The district court began with analysis of the
copyrightability of the three note sequence, noting that the only
copyright at issue was for the musical composition because the
Beastie Boys had properly licensed the rights to the sound
recording.163
The court found that neither the three note sequence nor
the vocalization technique were sufficiently unique to justify
copyright protection, as both are commonly used musical
techniques and occur only once in the recording of “Choir.”164
The court noted that Newton’s performance technique, which
expert testimony showed was quite distinctive, could be
considered sufficiently unique to justify copyright protection for
the sound recording, but not for the underlying composition.165
In the alternative, the court found that the Beastie Boys
copying of “Choir” was de minimis.166 The court stated that a
taking is de minimis “if the average audience would not
recognize the misappropriation.”167 Additionally, the court
stated that
[i]n such cases, “where there unquestionably is copying, albeit of only
a portion of [a] plaintiff’s song . . . [t]he proper question to ask is
whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1248-50.
Id. at 1253.
Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1257.
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qualitatively, ‘constituent elements of the work that are original’ such
that the copyright rises to the level of an unlawful appropriation.”168

In assessing the qualitative and quantitative importance of
the copied segment, the court looked only at its relation to the
original work and ignored its use in the new work.169
Quantitatively, the segment copied represented only two
percent of the entire “Choir” recording, which the court held
insufficient to overcome a de minimis finding.170 Similar to its
analysis of the copyrightability of the copied segment, the court
found that the copying of three commonly used notes from a
musical composition could not satisfy the substantial similarity
test.171 Integral to this finding was the court’s determination
that Newton’s actual sound recording should be ignored in the
Instead, the question the court
qualitative analysis.172
addressed was “whether someone might recognize—from a
performance of the notes and notated vocalization alone—the
source as the underlying musical composition.”173
Thus, due to the fact that the segment copied was
quantitatively small and the underlying musical composition
contained no qualitatively unique or distinctive elements, the
court found that the use was de minimis and not actionable as
a matter of law.174 In the language of the court, “no substantial
similarity [will] be found if only a small, common phrase
appears in both the accused and complaining songs . . . unless
the reappearing phrase is especially unique or qualitatively
important.”175
b. The Court of Appeals Decision – Newton II
The court of appeals upheld the decision of the district
court based solely on the argument that the use of the three
notes was de minimis and therefore not substantially similar,
choosing not to address the other argument.176
168. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282, 289-91 (D.N.J. 1993).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1258.
171. Newton I, 204 F.Supp.2d at 1258-59.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1258.
174. Id. at 1259.
175. Id. at 1256-57 (alteration in original) (citing Jean v. Bug Music, Inc.,
2002 WL 287786 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002)).
176. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 592-93 (9th Cir.
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal.
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The court adopted the Ringgold requirement that “[f]or an
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, there
must be substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s works.”177 However, the court looked to Fisher v.
Dees,178 the leading de minimis case in the Ninth Circuit, for
the applicable quantitative and qualitative tests for substantial
similarity.179 The court observed in Fisher that “a use is de
minimis only if the average audience would not recognize the
The court further adopted Nimmer’s
appropriation.”180
fragmented literal similarity analysis, explaining that “the
dispositive question is whether the similarity goes to trivial or
substantial elements. The substantiality of the similarity is
measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff’s
work as a whole.”181 The court intentionally did not look at the
use of the sampled portion in the defendant’s work, stating that
if this were analyzed the sample could be intentionally buried
or distorted by the defendant to escape liability.182 In the
present case, however, the Beastie Boys had looped the sample
throughout almost the entire song.183
The court held that the sampled portion was neither
quantitatively nor qualitatively significant to the plaintiff’s
work.184 The segment was only three notes played over six
seconds, or roughly two percent of the entire work, and was not
repeated.185 Newton argued that his technique of overblowing
the notes was a distinctive feature of the segment.186 However,
this ultimately worked to his disadvantage because no such
technique was noted on his written composition, and the
Beastie Boys had obtained a proper license for the recording.187

2002).
177. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 594.
178. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
179. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 594-95 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 596.
182. Id. at 597.
183. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 597.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Id. at 598.
187. Id.
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II. BRIDGEPORT MUSIC, INC. V. DIMENSION FILMS LLC
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC188 was one
of 476 cases severed by the court from the plaintiff’s original
complaint, which included approximately 500 causes of action
and 800 defendants.189 This case brings forward the questions
of the copyrightability of short segments of an original work, as
well as the relevance of the substantial similarity defense in
the context of digital sampling.
A. BACKGROUND
In May 1998, the defendant released the film “I Got the
Hook Up,” which included a recording of the NWA song “100
Miles and Runnin’” (“100 Miles”) on its soundtrack.190
Originally, the musical composition copyright to “100 Miles”
was co-owned by Dollarz N Sense Music (“DNSM”), Ruthless
Attack Muzick (“RAM”), Stone Agate Music, and Hancock
Music.191 The defendant claimed that in the summer of 1998
the original owners of the musical composition of “100 Miles”
granted it an oral license to use their composition in the film,
and in June 2002 executed synchronization licenses retroactive
to the film’s release date.192
In December 1998, as compensation for the use of a sample
from the George Clinton song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” (“Get
Off”), Bridgeport (the owner of the “Get Off” musical
composition copyright) acquired a twenty-five percent interest
in the musical composition for “100 Miles.”193 Bridgeport
argued that the oral licenses and synchronization licenses
“authorize[d] the use of each of the original owner’s interest,
not the work in its entirety.”194 Therefore, Bridgeport argued,
the defendant was not authorized to use Bridgeport’s twentyfive percent interest in the “100 Miles” musical composition
and was not authorized to use the sample from the “Get Off”
musical composition.195
188. 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films LLC (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004)
189. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC (“Bridgeport I”), 230
F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films LLC (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004)
190. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.

BRODIN_CLEAN_4-24-05

2005]

7/11/2006 6:47:33 PM

BRIDGEPORT MUSIC

845

Westbound Records, Inc. (“Westbound”) owned the
copyright to the “Get Off” sound recording.196 Westbound
brought a copyright infringement claim against the defendants
alleging unauthorized sampling of the “Get Off” sound
recording.197
The segment of “Get Off” that was sampled is described as:
an arpeggiated chord—that is, three notes that, if struck together,
comprise a chord but instead are played one at a time in very quick
succession—that is repeated several times at the opening of “Get Off.”
The arpeggiated chord is played on an unaccompanied electric guitar.
The rapidity of the notes and the way they are played produce a highpitched, whirling sound that captures the listener’s attention and
creates anticipation of what is to follow.198

The sample comprised of a two second portion of the chord
that was looped fourteen to sixteen times, appearing as a seven
to eight second long segment in five different parts of “100
Miles.”199 The sampled chord, which was used to evoke the
sound of a police siren in the background of the new work, was
slowed and the pitch was lowered to match the tempo of “100
Miles.”200
“Get Off” is a celebratory song about dancing with a
“strong dance beat and a display of intricate electric guitar
playing” accompanied by the lyrics of two expletives followed by
“get off your ass and jam” repeated throughout the song.201 By
comparison, “100 Miles” is a hip-hop song “about four black
men on the run from the F.B.I. who appear to be wrongfully
pursued for some unmentioned crime.”202
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION – BRIDGEPORT I
The district court’s decision in Bridgeport was in response
to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The
defendant asserted that it could not be found liable for
copyright infringement for several reasons:
(1) it possessed a valid license from at least one of Bridgeport’s coowners of the allegedly infringed work “100 Miles and Runnin” . . . (2)
Bridgeport executed a release related to “100 Miles”; (3) the portion of
Bridgeport’s composition “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” . . .that was
sampled by “100 Miles” is de minimis and therefore not subject to the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at. at 841.
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protection of the copyright laws; and (4) the portion of Westbound’s
sound recording of “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” that was sampled by
“100 Miles” is de minimis and therefore not subject to the protection
of the copyright laws.203

The first issue the district court addressed was whether
the oral or synchronization licenses granted by the original
owners gave the defendant the right to copy from the
composition.204 The court held that the defendant provided
sufficient evidence to prove that the oral licenses existed and
that the synchronization licenses simply recorded the
agreement.205 Further, the court noted that each copyright
owner has the right to license the use of the musical
composition as long as the proceeds are appropriately divided
and the other owners’ use and exploitation of their interest is
not encumbered.206 Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment for the defendants on all claims pertaining to the
musical composition.207
The only remaining claim was whether the defendant
infringed upon plaintiff Westbound’s copyright for the sound
recording of “Get Off,” which was not licensed by the
defendant.208 The defendant offered two reasons why this
claim should fail: “(1) the portion of “Get Off” that was copied
was not original and therefore not protected by copyright law;
(2) the sample of “Get Off” was legally insubstantial and
therefore the sample did not amount to actionable copying
under copyright law.”209 For the purpose of the summary
judgment motion, the court assumed that the sample was
digitally copied from the sound recording of “Get Off.”210
1. Originality of the Copied Portion
The defendant asserted that the chord that was sampled
from “Get Off” was a “commonly used collection of notes that,
standing alone, is not entitled to copyright protection.”211 The
court held that although a valid copyright raises a rebuttable
presumption of originality for the entire song, a defendant may
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 832.
See id. at 833-38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. at 838-39.
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still prove that the particular element sampled is unoriginal
and not entitled to copyright protection.212
Examining the copied chord, the court stated that “the
question does not turn on the originality of the chord, but in the
use of and the aural effect produced by the way the notes in the
chord are played, especially here where copying of the sound
recording is at issue.”213 After listening to the arpeggiated
chord in “Get Off,” the court found that a reasonable jury could
conclude that it is original and creative and consequently
protected by copyright.214 Thus, summary judgment on the
theory of lack of originality was denied.215
2. Copied Portion Not Substantially Similar
The defendant also asserted that even if the segment
copied was protected by copyright, it “is neither quantitatively
nor qualitatively significant to the plaintiffs’ copyright
interests in “Get Off” and therefore any copying of the chord is
not actionable as a matter of law.”216
The court began its analysis by noting that the Sixth
Circuit has recognized that the de minimis principle “can be
applied as a defense to copyright infringement if it can be
shown that a substantial amount of the copyrighted work was
not taken.”217 Ultimately, the court stated, it was asked to
“balance the interests protected by the copyright laws against
the stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws
may have on the artistic development of new works.”218
Additionally, the court noted that the lack of case law
addressing digital sampling or clear road maps of how to apply
the de minimis test from circuit courts or the Supreme Court
would complicate the process.219
According to the court, de minimis analysis falls under the
quantitative element of the substantial similarity element that
is necessary to prove actionable copying.220 In general, the
court felt that the test for substantial similarity was “whether
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 839.
Id.
Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839-40.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
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an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”221 The
court then adopted the language from Newton I and Jarvis,
stating that the question is “whether the defendant
appropriated,
either
quantitatively
or
qualitatively,
‘constituent elements of the work that are original.’”222 The
court also acknowledged Nimmer’s fragmented literal
similarity test.223
The court found that the two second guitar chord was
quantitatively small in comparison to the plaintiff’s work, but
noted that it played a significant role in the defendant’s
song.224 In analyzing the qualitative element, the court began
by noting that the two songs were very different in nature with
virtually no similarities in tone or mood.225 Additionally, the
copied chord had been altered to such an extent that it would
not be “recognizable to a lay observer as being appropriated
from the plaintiffs’ work,” even “one familiar with the works of
George Clinton.”226
The court summarized its reasoning as follows:
The Court recognizes that the fact of blatant copying is not
challenged by the defendant for the purposes of this motion, and
that the purposes of the copyright laws is to deter wholesale
plagiarism of prior works. However, a balance must be struck
between protecting an artist’s interests, and depriving other artists
of the building blocks of future works. Since the advent of Western
music, musicians have freely borrowed themes and ideas from other
musicians. If even an aficionado of George Clinton’s music might not
readily ascertain that his music has been borrowed, the purposes of
copyright law would not be served by punishing the borrower for his
creative use.227

Ultimately, the court held that the copied chord was so
small in size and unrecognizable as a misappropriation that the
two songs could not be considered substantially similar. Thus,
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
sound recording copyright claim.228
221. Id. at 840 (quoting Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records,
Inc., 1997 WL 158364 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)).
222. Id. at 841 (quoting Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d
1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282,
291 (D.N.J. 1993)).
223. Id. at 841.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 841-42.
226. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
227. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (internal citations omitted).
228. Id. at 843.
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C. SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS – BRIDGEPORT II
Westbound
appealed
from
the
district
court’s
determination that the defendant’s copying was de minimis
and therefore not actionable.229 Westbound challenged the
district court’s “articulation of the applicable standards and its
determination that there was no genuine issue of fact
precluding summary judgment on this issue.”230 At “[t]he heart
of Westbound’s arguments [was] the claim that no substantial
similarity or de minimis inquiry should be undertaken at all
when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally sampled
a copyrighted sound recording.”231 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted the defendant’s objection that this argument was
made for the first time upon appeal, but in the exercise of
discretion decided to examine this argument due to its
importance to the resolution of the issue.232
Before directly addressing Westbound’s argument, the
court of appeals laid out several general observations about the
nature and scope of its holding. First, the court of appeals
stated the analysis for determining copyright infringement for
a musical composition is not the same as the analysis that
should be applied for a sound recording.233 The court of appeals
agreed with the district court’s analysis as it would apply to a
musical composition, but, because this case involved a sound
recording, the court of appeals departed from this reasoning.234
The decision in this case was limited to the specific realm of
digital sampling due to the Sixth Circuit’s self-recognized
Finally, the court of
limited technological knowledge.235
appeals noted that the “music industry, as well as the courts,
are best served if something approximating a bright-line test
can be established. Not necessarily a ‘one size fits all’ test, but
one that, at least, adds clarity to what constitutes actionable
infringement with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted
sound recordings.”236
The court of appeals began its analysis with a review of the
229. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d
390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004).
230. Id. at 395.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 396 n.4.
233. Id. at 396.
234. Id.
235. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 396.
236. Id. at 397.
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applicable language from the Copyright Act. Specifically, the
court of appeals focused on the language of sections 114(a) and
106(2) that give the owner of a sound recording copyright the
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.”237 Section 114(b) of the Act further specifies
that the exclusive right “under clause (2) of section 106 is
limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the
actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged,
remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality,” but does
not “extend to the making or duplication of another sound
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate
those in the copyrighted sound recording.”238
According to the court of appeals, “copyright laws attempt
to strike a balance between protecting original works and
The balance applicable to
stifling further creativity.”239
copyright protection of sound recordings, as interpreted by the
court of appeals, is that the owner has the exclusive right to
duplicate the recording, while “the world at large is free to
imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the recording.”240
Ultimately, the court believed that the seminal question in the
case of digital sampling was “[i]f you cannot pirate the whole
sound recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than
the whole.” The court’s answer “to that question [was] in the
negative . . . . In other words, a sound recording owner has the
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”241
The court of appeals offered several reasons to support its
interpretation of the Copyright Act. First, “there is ease of
enforcement. Get a license or do not sample.”242 The court of
appeals did not view this as “stifling creativity in any
significant way,” because an artist could hire a musician to
duplicate the song in the studio.243 Second, the market will
keep the license price within bounds because it will have to be
less than the cost to duplicate the sample with musicians in the
studio.244 Third, “sampling is never accidental . . . you know
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)(2000)).
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)).
Id. at 398.
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398-99.
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you are taking another’s work product.”245
The court of appeals then addressed the specific question of
why the de minimis and substantial similarity principles apply
to the musical composition, but not to the sound recording.246
As discussed previously, the court of appeals believed its
interpretation was supported by the text of the Copyright
Act.247 Additionally, the court of appeals stated that “even
when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part
taken is something of value.”248 As proof, the court of appeals
offered the fact that producers sample to add something new to
the record, save costs, or both.249
The court of appeals then explained that although the
district court did an excellent job of applying the de minimis
and substantial similarity analysis, the case illustrated “the
kind of mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics
that would have to be employed” if this were the test adopted
by the courts.250 The value of the bright-line rule proposed
becomes apparent, the court of appeals explained, when
considering that the district court has 800 other cases involving
However, the court of appeals also
digital sampling.251
emphasized that “considerations of judicial economy” were not
what drove its opinion.252
The court of appeals further acknowledged the fact that its
decision followed no existing judicial precedent.253 However, it
did note that “[s]everal law review and text writers, some of
whom have been referenced in [the] opinion, have suggested
that this is the proper interpretation of the copyright statute as
it pertains to sound recordings.”254 Though there were many
opposing scholarly works, the court of appeals noted “where one
stands depends on where one sits.”255
In response to the assertion that its holding would stifle
creativity, the court of appeals stated that “many artists and
record companies have sought licenses as a matter of
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 399.
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399-400.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 401.
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course.”256 Additionally, the recordings created before 1971 are
not protected by the Copyright Act.257 Ultimately, the court of
appeals believed that licensing costs would not affect the ability
of artists to sample, and that older works not protected by
copyright would provide a cheap alternative. Notably, the
court of appeals concluded that “the record industry, including
the recording artists, has the ability and know-how to work out
guidelines, including a fixed schedule of license fees, if they so
choose.”258
Finally, the court of appeals stated that its analysis was
consistent with a “literal reading” of the Copyright Act.259 The
court of appeals did not find much assistance from the
legislative history of the Act because digital sampling was not
an issue when the laws were created.260 The court of appeals
stressed that if the record industry wants clarification of or
changes made to the Copyright Act, it has the ability to go back
to Congress:
This is the best place for the change to be made, rather than in the
courts, because as this case demonstrates, the court is never aware of
much more than the tip of the iceberg. To properly sort out this type
of problem with its complex technical and business overtones, one
needs the type of investigative resources as well as the ability to hold
hearings that is possessed by Congress.261

Based on its new formulation of the copyright protection of
sound recordings, the court of appeals reversed the entry of
summary judgment on Westbound’s claims.262
III. ANALYSIS
In Bridgeport II, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals lost
sight of the purpose of copyright protection and misinterpreted
the language of the Copyright Act. Although the bright-line
rule established by the court of appeals will make judicial
determination of infringement of a sound recording copyright
much easier, the rule is not supported by judicial precedent, a
“literal reading” of the Copyright Act, or the overall purpose of
copyright protection.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
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A. IGNORING PERSUASIVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to ignore all
persuasive decisions from other circuits in favor of a few
academic and business articles supporting the strict rule
announced by the court of appeals. Specifically, the court of
appeals ignored the language in the holdings and dicta of Tuff
‘N’ Rumble, Newton I, and Newton II that supported the use of
the substantial similarity test in sound recording copyright
infringement claims.
The court of appeals simply overlooked these cases, stating
“[w]e have not addressed in detail any of the cases frequently
cited in these music copyright cases because in the main they
involved infringement of the composition copyright and not the
However,
the
Second
sound recording copyright.”263
Circuit in Tuff ‘N’ Rumble applied the substantial similarity
test to determine if there was actionable copying in a claim
involving both the composition and the sound recording
copyrights. Further, although Newton I and II dealt only with
the copyright to the musical composition, both courts explained
in dicta how Newton’s unique performance style would apply to
a substantial similarity determination for the sound recording,
but not for the underlying composition.
Although these decisions were not binding on the Sixth
Circuit, they were the only judicial decisions previously
discussing the sampling of a sound recording. The district
court recognized these decisions and the court of appeals
should not have dismissed them so easily. Had the court of
appeals followed the tests laid out in the other circuits, it is
likely that summary judgment would have been granted due to
a lack of substantial similarity.
1. Applying the Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Analysis
The Tuff ‘N’ Rumble court’s test for substantial similarity
was whether, in looking at the two works as a whole, “‘an
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.’”264 In
Bridgeport I, the district court stated that even a George
Clinton aficionado—much less an average lay observer—would
263. Id. at 400 n.13.
264. Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 WL 158364
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)(quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d
1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)).
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not recognize the use of the sampled chord in “100 Miles.”265
The chord has been slowed and the pitch lowered so that it is
unrecognizable from its original form. Consequently, the
threshold for substantial similarity—recognized appropriation
by an average lay observer—was not met in Bridgeport I.
Therefore, the application of the Tuff ‘N’ Rumble test in
Bridgeport I supported summary judgment for the defendant
due to lack of substantial similarity.
2. Applying the Jarvis Analysis
The Jarvis court stated that “[t]he proper question to ask
is whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or
qualitatively, constituent elements of the work that are
original.”266 The district court in Bridgeport I found that the
sampled chord was quantitatively small in comparison to the
plaintiff’s work, although it played a more significant role in
the defendant’s work.267 According to the Jarvis court, if only a
small portion of a copyrighted work is taken, it can still be
substantially similar if the portion is unique enough to be
recognized as an important part of the original song. However,
the chord in Bridgeport I from “Get Off” is altered to such an
extent that the qualitatively unique elements of the chord are
unrecognizable to the lay observer. Therefore, the sample used
in “100 Miles” cannot be recognized as an important part of the
original song and did not satisfy the elements of the Jarvis
substantial similarity test.
Thus, in the absence of
quantitatively significant or qualitatively recognizable copying,
summary judgment for the defendant in Bridgeport I would
have been appropriate.
3. Applying the Newton I and II Analysis
The courts in Newton I and II, much like the court in
Jarvis, stated that there is not substantial similarity “if the
average audience would not recognize the misappropriation.”268
265. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F.
Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
266. Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (internal
citations omitted).
267. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
268. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir.
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
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In Newton I and II the courts held that an average audience
would not recognize the misappropriation of three notes in
respect to the musical composition.
Both courts noted,
however, that the sample would probably violate the sound
recording copyright, which the Beastie Boys had properly
licensed, due to Newton’s unique style.
As discussed
previously, however, the chord sampled from “Get Off” is
altered so significantly that an average audience would not be
able to recognize the misappropriation. Thus, although the
chord is unique within Clinton’s song, it was still not
recognizable as a misappropriation within “100 Miles.”
4. Applying the Ringgold Analysis
The Ringgold court held that substantial similarity
depended upon the “observability of the copied work—the
length of time the copied work is observable in the allegedly
infringing work and such factors as focus, lighting, camera
angles, and prominence.”269 Applying this to the Bridgeport I
digital sampling context, the question becomes the amount of
time the sample is used in the infringing work and its
recognizability in respect to the other sounds. The sampled
chord from “Get Off” can be heard in a little less than forty
seconds of “100 Miles,” which is far from insignificant.270
However, due to the manipulation of the sound of the chord and
its use within a completely different style of music, the sample
is virtually unrecognizable when compared to the original. If
the sample is unrecognizable, then it cannot be observable for
any amount of time in the new work. Ultimately, if the
copyrighted work cannot even be identified within the
infringing work, it is unlikely that substantial similarity
should be found.
5. Conclusion
It is highly likely that the application of any of the tests
laid out in previous cases would result in summary judgment
for the defendant in Bridgeport I due to lack of substantial
similarity. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals chose
not to address these persuasive holdings, but instead focused
its analysis upon its reading of the Copyright Act.
269. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir.
1997).
270. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 394.
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B. A “LITERAL READING” OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In its decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relies
upon the language of sections 106 and 114 of the Copyright Act
that grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to make
derivative works. However, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
of the statutory language does not take into account the
purpose of each of the clauses in context to the whole and
ignores the meaning of the term “derivative works.”
Section 106 of the Copyright Act is intended to establish
the rights exclusive to the owner of the musical composition
copyright.271 Section 114(a) extends many of these rights to
sound recording copyrights, including the right to create
derivative works.272 Section 114(b), however, actually limits
the right to create derivative works to the actual sounds from
the sound recordings, clearing the way for imitation.273
Under the Sixth Circuit’s reading of 114(b), the use of the
words “actual sounds” creates an absolute right in the
copyright holder to sample from the sound recording.274 A
better reading of this section indicates that the words “actual
sounds” are words of limitation intended to show that the
copyright protection of a sound recording does not extend to the
ideas of the sounds, but only to the actual sounds
themselves.275 It does not follow that because copyright
protection of a sound recording is limited to the actual sounds
that the right to sample those sounds is absolute. If Congress
intended for the right to be absolute, the language required to
convey the idea could be extremely clear and unambiguous.
Ultimately, the court of appeals took words of limitation and
created an unconvincing and strained argument that they were
intended to give the owner of a sound recording copyright the
absolute right to sample from the recording.
The better interpretation of section 114(b) is that the
exclusive right to create derivative works provided to the owner
of a sound recording copyright is the same as the right provided
to the owner of a musical composition copyright, but limited to
the actual sounds on the recording. Thus, the creator of a new
work is subject to a composition infringement claim only if
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Id. § 114(a).
Id. § 114(b).
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 394.
See Nimmer, supra note 29, § 8.05.
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there has been an illegal appropriation of the original work,
which is ultimately determined using the substantial similarity
test.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit generally ignored the
definition of “derivative work” within the context of section
114(b). As defined in section 101, a work must be “based upon”
a preexisting work to be considered “derivative.”276 This
indicates that there must be some minimal level of similarity
between the two works for the new work to be considered
derivative. As Nimmer states, a work is only derivative if it
“has substantially copied from a prior work.”277 Consequently,
both 114(b) and 101 require “substantial similarity” between
the copyrighted work and the new work to prove that there has
been an illegal appropriation.
It would be a far stretch to say that “100 Miles” is based on
or is substantially similar to “Get Off.” One chord lasting two
seconds was copied from “Get Off,” and it is so significantly
altered that, in the words of the district court, “even an
aficionado of George Clinton’s music might not readily
ascertain that his music has been borrowed.”278 Additionally,
“100 Miles” cannot seriously be considered a musical
arrangement, condensation, adaptation, or any of the other
examples of derivative works listed in section 101. Ultimately,
Westbound cannot establish a copyright violation because “100
Miles” is neither substantially similar to, nor a derivative work
of “Get Off.” Therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing
the district court’s summary judgment decision.
C. THE HOLDING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO
THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The purpose of copyright protection, as stated in the
Constitution, is to promote the progress of a useful art.279 As
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals put it, “[t]he copyright laws
attempt to strike a balance between protecting original works
However, the decision
and stifling further creativity.280
announced by the court of appeals in Bridgeport II did
276. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
277. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01 (emphasis in original).
278. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F.
Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
279. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
280. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 398.
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everything possible to protect original works while
backhandedly dismissing all evidence that its new rule would
significantly stifle creativity.
1. Ease of Application Does Not Excuse Inconsistency with the
Law
The first argument offered by the court of appeals in
support of its bright-line rule was ease of enforcement.281 It is
apparent that the court of appeals believed that the existing
tests for substantial similarity and de minimis use were
confusing and unpredictable, causing trouble for both the
judicial system and for the music industry.
In concluding its analysis, the court of appeals admitted
that there is no “Rosetta stone” for interpretation of the
Copyright Act.282 Technological and musical advances have
progressed much further than the drafters of the statute could
have imagined, and the laws as written are difficult to apply
today. However, the fact that the language is difficult to apply
does not give a court a license to find additional rights in words
of limitation, especially rights that ultimately violate the
purpose of the Copyright Act itself. Instead, a court is bound
by a duty to apply generally accepted existing tests or to create
new tests that remain consistent with the law. Congress alone
has the right to expand or constrict the rights of copyright
holders.
Although ease of application is a valid concern, the test
must be consistent with the textual meaning and purpose of
the law itself, regardless of whether it is difficult to apply or
predict. The holding of the court of appeals is easy to apply;
however, it is not consistent with the Copyright Act.283
2. The Act Was Not Intended to Protect the Livelihood of
Studio Musicians
Next, the court of appeals argued that copying even a small
portion of a sound recording is taking something of value.284 As
proof, the court of appeals stated that artists’ main reason for
sampling was to save money by avoiding hiring studio
musicians to simulate the sounds, a problem it characterized as
particularly dangerous to the music profession because “‘the
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 401.
See supra Part III.B.
Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399.
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musician is being replaced with himself.’”285 The court of
appeals seems to lament the fact that the old ways of creating
music are, in some modern music genres, being replaced with
new technology that eliminates much of the need for live
musicians.
However, it is the purpose of the Copyright Act to promote
the creation of new art, not to ensure that studio musicians
continue to get paid for simulating old sounds. The rationale of
the court of appeals has nothing to do with this purpose.
Hiring a studio musician to simulate a sound from an existing
work, as the court of appeals would have artists do, is not the
creation of new art; nor does it promote creation by rewarding
the original author.
In any case, it seems highly unlikely and uneconomical
that NWA would hire a studio musician to come in and play
one chord so that they could record it and digitally alter it for
their song. Additionally, many artists are not signed by a
record company and cannot afford studio time, much less studio
musicians. Consequently, artists will be discouraged from
using small segments, which would not in themselves qualify
for copyright protection, to create new and unique songs.
Ultimately, the argument of the court of appeals does not
protect the original creator and actually discourages future
creative musical works.
3. Requiring Licensing of All Samples Will Diminish Creativity
The court of appeals further defended its position by noting
that many artists receive licenses for samples as a matter of
course, and that there is a large body of music that is not
protected by copyright.286 The court of appeals once again,
however, missed the point. Many artists sample enough of a
pre-existing work so that it is substantially similar to their new
work. Licensing is always necessary in these circumstances.
The fact that some artists do pay for licenses to sample a single
chord does not demonstrate that it will not stifle creativity.
Artists that have the money may wish to avoid the uncertainty
of litigation and pay for a license for everything they sample.
However, the creativity of those artists that cannot afford to
license every beat and note they sample will be significantly
285. Id. at 399, n.11 (quoting Christopher D. Abrahamson, Digital
Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1668 (1999)).
286. Id. at 401.
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curtailed by this decision.
Similarly, the fact that there is a body of music that is not
protected by a sound recording copyright does not absolve the
court of appeals of the fact that the holding eliminates access to
all music recorded for more than the last thirty years. The
ruling of the court of appeals effectively limits the pool of
available resources for modern artists that sample small pieces
of existing works to create something new and original, thus
hindering creativity.
The court of appeals also failed to adequately acknowledge
the practical result of its decision. In reality, creativity will be
significantly affected as a considerable amount of music will
become too expensive or impossible to license. The court of
appeals gave absolute monopoly power to the copyright owners
over the sounds that they record. This will give them a
significant bargaining advantage over the potential sampler.
In addition, the lack of a mandatory licensing system will make
it possible for artists that do not consider hip-hop a valid art
form to deny a sampling license, ultimately stifling the very
creativity that the copyright act was intended to promote.
Additionally, many hip-hop artists will be forced to
abandon sampling or reduce the number of samples used in a
new song. Chuck D and Shocklee from the group Public Enemy
believed that the decision in Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.287 significantly hurt hip-hop because
the samples became too expensive, and incorporating multiple
samples into a song was almost impossible.288 They opined
that this eliminated an artist’s ability to take many
unrecognizable samples and create a collage.289 Indeed, Public
Enemy was forced to change their entire sound because of the
overwhelming cost of sampling after Grand Upright.290 The
decision in Bridgeport II marks a return to the extremely strict
per se infringement rule first handed down in Grand Upright,
and will ultimately lead to reduced creativity and creation.

287. 780 F. Supp 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
288. See Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An
Interview With Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank Shocklee, STAY FREE!, Fall
2002,
available
at
http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/public_enemy.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
289. See id.
290. Id.
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4. It Is Outside the Authority of the Court to Pressure the
Music Industry into a Mandatory Licensing System
The court of appeals further rationalized its decision by
stating that the music industry has the ability and the knowhow to create a mandatory licensing system for digital
samples.291 The decision will likely put pressure on the
industry to create pricing guidelines for digital sampling; but
the ends do not justify the means. It is not within the
authority of a court to encourage a mandatory licensing scheme
for a practice that is not in itself a violation of the copyright
law. Any licensing scheme must be consistent with the laws
contained in the Copyright Act, as must any decision by the
judiciary. This decision, as well as any licensing scheme that
results from it, is not consistent with the Copyright Act.
Additionally, there is still a significant amount of sampling
that will satisfy the substantial similarity test and put
significant pressure on the music industry and on Congress to
create a mandatory licensing system that is consistent with the
purposes of copyright protection.
5. There Is No Intent Element In the Copyright Act
The final argument the court of appeals gave for its
holding was that digital sampling is never an unintentional
copying.292 However, the elements necessary to demonstrate a
prima facie case of copyright infringement do not include the
showing of a particular state of mind. This protects the
copyright holder by allowing the copyright holder to prove
infringement without having to show that a defendant
knowingly copied from the copyrighted work. An artist that
subconsciously copies a significant amount of another artist’s
work has infringed upon the copyright as much as a person
who intentionally samples a significant amount of another’s
work. The same is true for de minimis copying: an artist who
copies a de minimis amount of another’s work has not infringed
upon the copyright regardless of whether it was intentional or
unintentional.
6. Conclusion
Any private benefit experienced by creators is incidental to
the purpose of maximization of public benefit from the arts.
291. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 401.
292. Id. at 399.
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The reason that copyright owners have limited rights over the
musical composition and sound recording is so that they are
encouraged to create new works. However, it is highly unlikely
that artists will decide not to create because a few seconds of
their sound recording could be copied, altered into a very
different sound, and incorporated into a new work that is very
different from the original. The bright line test laid out by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bridgeport II will
significantly reduce the pool of sounds that can be sampled to
create new and original works, ultimately working against the
purpose of the Copyright Act.
D. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IS THE PROPER DECISION
As the court of appeals noted, the district court did a very
good job of navigating the applicable de minimis and
substantial similarity tests based upon the statutes and the
available digital sampling case law.
The fundamental
difference between the two decisions was the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of section 114(b) of the Copyright Act, which it
believed granted the copyright holder the exclusive and
absolute right to sample from the sound recording. However,
as discussed previously, the correct interpretation is that the
language in this section actually limits, not enhances, the
rights of the copyright owner. Thus, had the court of appeals
correctly interpreted the Copyright Act, it most likely would
have applied the substantial similarity test and arrived at the
same conclusion as the district court.
The district court’s analysis demonstrates how difficult it is
to apply the substantial similarity test. However, it also
clearly illustrates that the courts can apply the test to achieve
an outcome consistent with the purpose of the copyright laws.
The district court did an excellent job of navigating the
relevant case law and statutes. As the district court concluded,
the elements necessary to prove infringement of a sound
recording copyright are: (1) valid ownership of the copyright;
(2) copying of the work by the defendant; and, (3) substantial
similarity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly
infringing work.293
293. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F.
Supp. 2d 830, 840 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (“The plaintiff must show, in addition to
proof of copying, that the copied work and the allegedly infringing work are
substantially similar.”), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films
(“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
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The substantial similarity test consists of a quantitative
analysis—the de minimis determination—and a qualitative
analysis. Copying is de minimis when the amount taken is so
insignificant that the law will not consider it actionable.
However, even small segments can have significant value to a
work, so the qualitative analysis will almost always be
necessary. As the district court stated, substantial similarity
exists when “‘an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work.’”294 This ultimately requires both a qualitative and
quantitative analysis of the copied segment both in the original
work and the new work. The district court, similar to the court
in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,295 examined the
quantitative and qualitative importance of the copied segment
in relation to the original work, as well as the recognizability
and prominence of the segment within the new work.
Although this test will require a rigorous analysis by
judges and juries, it is more reflective of the language and
purpose of the Copyright Act than the bright line rule
announced by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. As with most
laws, the Copyright Act needs to be updated by Congress to
reflect the technological and musical advancements of the past
thirty years. Nevertheless, until this occurs the courts must
apply the law that exists in the way that it was intended. The
district court decision in Bridgeport I remained true to the
language and purpose of the Copyright Act and should not have
been reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Copyright Act of 1976 was not written with digital
sampling in mind. Consequently, the courts have had much
difficulty creating tests that are consistent with the language
and purpose of the Act and are predictable and easy to apply.
In an attempt to clarify this area of the law, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals created a bright-line rule making any
sampling of a sound recording a per se infringement. Although
this rule is predictable and easy to apply, it is inconsistent with
the language and purpose of the Copyright Act. Ultimately,
the district court decision, which required the owner of a sound
recording copyright to prove unlawful appropriation by
294. Id. at 840 (quoting Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records,
Inc., 1997 WL 158364 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)).
295. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
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demonstrating substantial similarity, is the correct
interpretation of the law as it is written. The substantial
similarity test provides protection against the copying of
significant portions of a copyrighted work while allowing
insignificant copying that will ultimately benefit the general
public in the form of new original works.

